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INTRODUCTION 
y recent book Public Policy in an Uncertain World argues 
broadly that society should face up to the uncertainties that 
attend policy formation.1 I observe that the current practice of policy 
analysis suffers from incredible certitude.2 That is, researchers use 
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untenable assumptions to make precise predictions of policy 
outcomes. I recommend performing credible policy analysis that 
explicitly expresses the limits to knowledge by providing interval 
rather than point predictions.3 I consider how policy makers might 
make reasonable decisions in an uncertain world.4 
These themes apply with considerable force to drug control policy. 
In 2001, the National Research Council (NRC) Committee on Data 
and Research for Policy on Illegal Drugs, which I chaired, found that 
society faces huge uncertainties when attempting to predict the 
consequences of alternative drug control policies.5 In its final report, 
the committee called attention to “a woeful lack of investment in 
programs of data collection and empirical research that would enable 
evaluation of the nation’s investment in drug law enforcement.”6 It 
called on the federal government to remedy this serious deficiency, 
observing that “[i]t is unconscionable for this country to continue to 
carry out a public policy of this magnitude and cost without any way 
of knowing whether and to what extent it is having the desired 
effect.”7 
Writing now, over a decade later, I am disappointed that the nation 
has not subsequently invested enough in data and research. 
Consequently, we remain unable to evaluate the effectiveness of drug 
control policy. Yet we have to formulate policy nonetheless. This 
Article considers how we might do so. 
As a prelude, Part I uses a prominent case study examined by the 
NRC committee to illustrate how analysis of drug control policy has 
suffered from incredible certitude. Part II lists a set of data 
deficiencies and unsettled research questions that the NRC committee 
highlighted as severe impediments to policy evaluation. With this 
background, Part III asks how we might reasonably formulate drug 
control policy in an uncertain world. I sketch a proposal for adaptive 
diversification of drug laws. 
	
1 CHARLES F. MANSKI, PUBLIC POLICY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: ANALYSIS AND 
DECISIONS (2013). 
2 Id. at 2–3. 
3 Id. at 3. 
4 Id. 
5 COMM. ON DATA & RESEARCH FOR POLICY ON ILLEGAL DRUGS, NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, INFORMING AMERICA’S POLICY ON ILLEGAL DRUGS: WHAT WE DON’T KNOW 
KEEPS HURTING US 3 (Charles F. Manski et al. eds., 2001), available at http://www.nap 
.edu/catalog/10021.html. 
6 Id. at 2.  
7 Id. at 11. 
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I 
DUELING CERTITUDES: THE RAND AND IDA STUDIES OF COCAINE 
CONTROL POLICY 
Drug control policy has long been normatively contentious, with 
Americans varying in their moral judgment of drug use and in their 
concern with the collateral consequences of drug law enforcement. 
Policy analysis has also been contentious, with dueling policy studies 
using different data and methodology to reach sharply different 
conclusions about policy outcomes. Each of the two dueling studies 
may make sense in its own terms, combining data with assumptions to 
draw logically valid conclusions. However, there may be no way to 
determine which study (if either) makes realistic assumptions and 
which (if either) draws empirically correct conclusions. 
A. RAND and IDA Studies 
Dueling studies of cocaine control policy performed in the mid-
1990s by analysts at RAND8 and the Institute for Defense Analyses 
(IDA)9 provide an apt illustration. The RAND and IDA studies 
considered the same hypothetical objective for cocaine-control policy, 
namely reduction in cocaine consumption in the United States by one 
percent.10 Both studies predicted the monetary cost of using certain 
policies to achieve this objective. However, the two studies used 
different analytical approaches and data sources to reach dramatically 
different policy conclusions. 
The RAND study specified a model of the supply and demand for 
cocaine that aimed to formally characterize the complex interaction of 
producers and users and the subtle process through which alternative 
cocaine-control policies may affect consumption and prices.11 It used 
this model to evaluate various demand-control and supply-control 
policies and concluded that drug treatment is much more cost-
effective than any policy aiming to reduce the supply of drugs: 
The analytical goal is to make the discounted sum of cocaine 
reductions over 15 years equal to 1 percent of current annual 
	
8 C. PETER RYDELL & SUSAN S. EVERINGHAM, DRUG POLICY RESEARCH CTR., 
RAND, CONTROLLING COCAINE: SUPPLY VERSUS DEMAND PROGRAMS (1994) (reporting 
for the Office of National Drug Control Policy and the U.S. Army). 
9 BARRY D. CRANE ET AL., INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSES, AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION 
OF COUNTERDRUG INTERDICTION PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS (IDA Paper P-3219, 1997). 
10 See RYDELL & EVERINGHAM, supra note 8, at xiii; CRANE ET AL., supra note 9, at 
2–3. 
11 RYDELL & EVERINGHAM, supra note 8, at 7–8. 
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consumption. The most cost-effective program is the one that 
achieves this goal for the least additional control-program 
expenditure in the first projection year. The additional spending 
required to achieve the specified consumption reduction is $783 
million for source-country control, $366 million for interdiction, 
$246 million for domestic enforcement, or $34 million for treatment 
. . . . The least costly supply-control program (domestic 
enforcement) costs 7.3 times as much as treatment to achieve the 
same consumption reduction.12 
The IDA study examined the time-series association between 
source-zone interdiction activities and retail cocaine prices.13 It 
reached an entirely different policy conclusion: 
[A] rough estimate of cost-effectiveness indicates that the cost of 
decreasing cocaine use by one percent through the use of source 
zone interdiction efforts is on the order of a few tens of millions of 
dollars and not on the order of a billion dollars as reported in [the 
RAND study]. The differences are primarily attributed to a failure 
in the earlier research to account for the major costs imposed on the 
traffickers by interdiction operations and overestimation of the costs 
of conducting interdiction operations.14 
Thus, the IDA study specifically rebutted a key finding of the RAND 
study. 
When they appeared, the RAND and IDA studies drew attention to 
the ongoing struggle over federal funding of drug control activities. 
The RAND study was used to argue that funding should be shifted 
towards drug treatment programs and away from activities to reduce 
drug production or to interdict drug shipments.15 The IDA study, 
undertaken in part as a re-analysis of the RAND findings,16 was used 
	
12 Id. at xiii. 
13 CRANE ET AL., supra note 9, at 1–2. 
14 Id. at 2–3. 
15 For example, in a statement to the National Security, International Affairs, and 
Criminal Justice Subcommittee in the U.S. House of Representatives, Lee Brown, then 
director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, stated the following: 
Let me now talk about what we know works in addressing the drug problem. 
There is compelling evidence that treatment is cost-effective and provides 
significant benefits to public safety. In June 1994, a RAND Corporation study 
concluded that drug treatment is the most cost-effective drug control 
intervention. 
Effectiveness of the National Drug Control Strategy and the Status of the Drug War: 
Hearings Before the Nat’l Sec., Int’l Affairs, & Criminal Justice Subcomm. of the H. 
Comm. on Governmental Reform & Oversight, 104th Cong. 61 (1996) (statement of Lee 
Brown, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy). 
16 CRANE ET AL., supra note 9, at I-3. 
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to argue that interdiction activities should be funded at present levels 
or higher.17 
B. The NRC Assessment 
The NRC committee was asked by the U.S. Office of National 
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to assess the two studies.18 The 
committee concluded that neither study constitutes a persuasive basis 
for the formation of cocaine control policy.19 The committee 
summarized its assessment of the RAND study as follows: 
[T]he RAND study does not yield usable empirical findings on the 
relative cost-effectiveness of alternative policies in reducing 
cocaine consumption. The study makes many unsubstantiated 
assumptions about the processes through which cocaine is 
produced, distributed, and consumed. Plausible changes in these 
assumptions can change not only the quantitative findings reported, 
but also the main qualitative conclusions of the study. The study is 
also seriously deficient in its use of the Treatment Outcomes 
Prospective Study (TOPS) data to estimate the effectiveness of 
cocaine treatment programs. Hence, the findings of the RAND 
study do not constitute a persuasive basis for the formation of 
cocaine control policy.20 
It summarized its assessment of the IDA study this way: 
	
17 For example, in a hearing specifically devoted to the IDA study, chairman William 
H. Zeliff began this way: 
 We are holding these hearings today to review a study on drug policy, a study 
we believe to have significant findings, prepared by an independent group, the 
Institute for Defense Analysis, at the request of Secretary of Defense Perry in 
1994. 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he subcommittee has questioned for some time the administration’s strong 
reliance on treatment as the key to winning our Nation’s drug war, and 
furthermore this subcommittee has questioned the wisdom of drastically cutting 
to the bone interdiction programs in order to support major increases in hard-core 
drug addiction treatment programs.The basis for this change in strategy has been 
the administration’s reliance on the 1994 RAND study. 
Review of the Internal Administration’s Study Critical of Clinton Drug Policy and White 
House Supression of Study: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec., Int’l Affairs, & 
Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on Governmental Reform & Oversight, 104th Cong. 1 
(1996) (statement of Hon. William H. Zeliff, Chairman, Subcomm. On Nat’l Sec., Int’l 
Affairs, & Criminal Justice). 
18 COMM. ON DATA & RESEARCH FOR POLICY ON ILLEGAL DRUGS, NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, ASSESSMENT OF TWO COST-EFFECTIVENESS STUDIES ON COCAINE CONTROL 
POLICY, at ix (Charles F. Manski et al. eds., 1999). 
19 Id. at 1–2. 
20 Id. at 28. 
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[T]he IDA study does not yield useful empirical findings on the 
cost-effectiveness of interdiction policies to reduce cocaine 
consumption. Major flaws in the assumptions, data, and methods of 
the study make it impossible to accept the IDA findings as a basis 
for the assessment of interdiction policies. For example, the 
conclusions drawn from the data rest on the assumption that all 
time-series deviations in cocaine price from an exponential decay 
path should be attributed to interdiction events, not to other forces 
acting on the market for cocaine. Numerous problems diminish the 
credibility of the cocaine price series developed in the study, and an 
absence of information prevents assessment of the procedure for 
selecting interdiction events.21 
Thus, the committee concluded that neither the RAND nor the IDA 
study provides a credible estimate of what it would cost to use 
alternative policies to reduce cocaine consumption in the United 
States. 
C. Reflections 
When I think now about the RAND and IDA studies, I consider 
their many differences to be less salient than their shared lack of 
credibility. Each study may be coherent internally, but each rests on 
such a fragile foundation of weak data and unsubstantiated 
assumptions as to undermine its findings. 
What troubles me most about the studies is their injudicious efforts 
to draw strong policy conclusions. It is not necessarily problematic 
for researchers to try to make sense of weak data and to use 
unsubstantiated assumptions. However, the strength of the 
conclusions drawn in a study should be commensurate with the 
quality of the evidence and the credibility of the assumptions. When 
researchers overreach, they give away their own credibility and they 
diminish public trust in science. The damage to public trust is 
particularly severe when researchers inappropriately draw strong 
conclusions about matters as contentious as drug policy. 
Unfortunately, these features of the RAND and IDA studies are not 
unusual. Studies that assert dueling certitudes regarding policy 
outcomes are common. Why do policy researchers so often provide 
conflicting perspectives on questions of public interest? I see two 
reasons. 
One reason that policy researchers may assert such differing 
perspectives is the inherent difficulty of studying human behavior. 
	
21 Id. at 43. 
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The conclusions that can be drawn from any analysis are determined 
by the assumptions made and by the data brought to bear. The range 
of plausible assumptions about human behavior is wide. The available 
data are limited to observations that can be made without undue 
intrusion. Researchers combining limited data with different 
maintained assumptions can, and often do, reach different logically 
valid conclusions. 
A distinct problem is the failure of researchers to face up to the 
difficulty of their enterprise. Researchers sometimes do not recognize 
that the interpretation of data requires assumptions. Researchers 
sometimes understand the logic of scientific inference but ignore it 
when reporting their own work. The scientific community rewards 
those who produce strong novel findings. The public, impatient for 
solutions to its pressing concerns, rewards those who offer simple 
analyses leading to unequivocal policy recommendations. These 
incentives make it tempting for researchers to maintain assumptions 
far stronger than they can persuasively defend, in order to draw strong 
conclusions. I believe that this is what happened in the RAND and 
IDA studies. 
II 
DATA DEFICIENCIES AND UNSETTLED RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The NRC committee called attention to numerous data deficiencies 
and unsettled research questions that make it very difficult to evaluate 
drug control policy. Regarding data, the committee emphasized “the 
absence of adequate data on drug consumption and reliable data on 
drug prices.”22 Regarding research, it stressed our lack of knowledge 
of how drug suppliers and users respond to the threat of detection and 
punishment.23 I explain below. 
A. Data on Drug Consumption and Prices 
Existing surveys of drug use collect information on frequencies of 
use but not on the quantity of drugs that users consume. The 
committee observed that quantity data are essential for 
“understanding the operation of drug markets; the dynamics of 
initiation [and termination of drug use]; the response of drug use[] to 
	
22 COMM. ON DATA & RESEARCH FOR POLICY ON ILLEGAL DRUGS, supra note 5, at 3. 
23 Id. 
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changes in price; and the public health and economic consequences of 
drug use.”24 
The NRC committee called attention to the fact that the 
information on drug prices regularly used in research studies “is 
derived from data collected for the purpose of providing evidence in 
criminal trials” rather than from a well-designed sampling process 
intended to reveal the prices that drug users typically pay.25 It may 
seem that the accuracy of estimates of the prices of illegal drugs is a 
technical concern of importance only to a small community of 
researchers. However, the committee observed that “accurate drug 
price data are critical for measuring the success of [drug control] 
policy, a primary aim of which is to increase the retail price of drugs 
and, thereby, to reduce consumption.”26 
B. The Behavioral Response of Drug Suppliers and Users to 
Sanctions 
Considering the supply of drugs, the committee found “particularly 
strong needs for empirical research on” the following three questions: 
1. Geographic substitution: To what extent can producers and 
traffickers thwart enforcement in one geographic area by moving 
production or smuggling routes elsewhere? 
2. Deterrence: How can the deterrent effects of supply-reduction 
activities be measured? How large are they? 
3. Adaptation: What is the time lag between successful 
enforcement operations and adaptive responses on the part of 
producers and traffickers?27 
More generally, the committee recommended that ONDCP encourage 
development of “a sustained program of information gathering and     
. . . research aiming to discover how drug production, transport, and 
distribution respond to interdiction and domestic enforcement 
activities.”28 
Considering the demand for drugs, the committee observed that an 
important component of American drug control policy has been to 
attempt to reduce demand “by deterring use and by incapacitating 
	
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 3–4. 
27 Id. at 5. 
28 Id. 
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users.”29 A rational drug control policy must take appropriate account 
of the benefits and costs of enforcing sanctions against drug users. 
Here too, research has been sorely lacking. Hence, the committee 
recommended government support for “research on the declarative 
and deterrent effects, costs, and cost-effectiveness of sanctions against 
the use of illegal drugs.”30 The committee urged that “[p]articular 
attention . . . be paid to the relation between severity of . . . sanctions 
and . . . the rates of initiation and termination of . . . drug use among 
different segments of the population.”31 
III 
ADAPTIVE DIVERSIFICATION OF DRUG LAWS 
The data deficiencies and unsettled research questions described 
above, plus others, imply that we lack the knowledge needed to 
determine an optimal drug control policy. Yet policy choices must be 
made. How might we reasonably proceed? 
When it is feasible to have policy vary across persons or groups of 
persons, I have argued that adaptive diversification offers an 
appealing strategy to cope with uncertainty and reduce it over time.32 
I first explain the general idea and then consider how it might be 
applied to drug control policy. 
A. Adaptive Diversification 
Financial diversification has long been a familiar recommendation 
for portfolio allocation, where an investor allocates wealth across a 
set of investments. A portfolio is “diversified” if the investor allocates 
positive fractions of wealth to different investments, rather than all to 
one investment. An investor with full knowledge of the returns to 
alternative investments would not diversify. He would be better off 
investing all of his wealth in the investment with the highest return. 
The rationale for diversification arises purely from incompleteness 
of knowledge. Broadly speaking, diversification enables someone 
who is uncertain about the returns to investments to balance potential 
	
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 See Charles F. Manski, The 2009 Lawrence R. Klein Lecture: Diversified Treatment 
Under Ambiguity, 50 INT’L ECON. REV. 1013, 1038 (2009). 
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errors. Diversification prevents the massive losses that may occur if 
one puts “all eggs in one basket.”33 
The rationale for policy diversification is analogous. Policy choice 
is diversified if society randomly applies different policies to different 
persons. A society having complete knowledge of policy outcomes 
should not diversify; it should determine the best policy and apply it 
everywhere. A society that is unsure of the best policy may want to 
diversify to balance potential errors and prevent a very bad societal 
outcome. 
Diversification differs from profiling. “[Policy d]iversification calls 
for randomly differential treatment of persons,” or groups of 
persons.34 “Profiling . . . calls for systematically differential treatment 
of [groups of] persons who differ in observable attributes thought to 
be associated with [policy] response.”35 Profiling may be good policy 
when society knows something about how policy response varies 
across groups of persons and can, therefore, tailor policy to the group. 
Diversification may be appealing when society does not know how 
policy response varies across the population. Then society cannot 
systematically differentiate policy, yet may find it beneficial to 
randomly vary policy to cope with uncertainty. 
The above discussion concerns policy choice at a single point in 
time. Now suppose that society can periodically update its policy 
choices over time. Then society may learn, with observation of the 
outcomes experienced in earlier periods informing policy choice later 
on. Diversification is advantageous for learning because it randomly 
assigns persons to policies and, thus, yields the advantages for policy 
analysis of randomized experiments. The idea of adaptive 
diversification is to use the lessons learned from observation of earlier 
outcomes to update the allocation of persons to policies later on. 
To illustrate, adaptive diversification might be implemented by a 
health care agency that assigns medical treatments to persons, such as 
the U.K. National Health Service or the U.S. Military Health System. 
Suppose that A is the status quo treatment for a disease and that B is 
an innovation. Suppose that the health agency a priori knows the 
effectiveness of treatment A but not that of B. Then the agency might 
initially diversify treatment in accord with its knowledge, assigning 
some fraction of patients to A and the remainder to B. Over time, the 
	
33 Id. at 1038. 
34 MANSKI, supra note 1, at 140. 
35 Id. 
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agency observes the health outcomes of persons given treatment B 
and, thus, learns response to this treatment. As information 
accumulates, the agency can update the allocation of new patients in 
accord with what it learns. Eventually, it will fully learn response to 
treatment B and, thereafter, allocate all patients to the better 
treatment. Thus, a health agency that adaptively diversifies treatment 
gradually decides between A and B as knowledge of treatment 
response accumulates. 
B. Adaptive Diversification of Drug Policy through Federalism 
In the context of drug control policy, the analog of the medical 
treatments A and B may be alternative drug laws. For example, A 
may be a current law making recreational use of marijuana a criminal 
offense and B may be an alternative that decriminalizes this type of 
drug use. The purest form of adaptive diversification would have 
society randomly divide the population into two treatment groups, 
those who are subject to criminal penalties for marijuana use and the 
remainder who are not. Over time, we could observe the addiction, 
health, and socioeconomic outcomes of persons in the two groups, 
learn how the different policies affect personal life trajectories, and 
adaptively update the allocation of persons to the two groups. 
In practice, random application of different laws to different 
individuals is infeasible in a society that places high value on the 
principle of equal treatment of equals. The Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution, in fact, guarantees equal treatment of “similarly 
situated” persons.36 However, American federalism does permit 
application of different laws to persons who reside in different 
states.37 Hence, federalism enables implementation of an approximate 
version of adaptive diversification. 
Indeed, the American progressive movement has long appreciated 
that federalism enables the states to experiment with new policy 
ideas. A century ago, Theodore Roosevelt wrote this about Senator 
Robert La Follette: “Thanks to the movement for genuinely 
democratic popular government which Senator La Follette led to 
overwhelming victory in Wisconsin, that state has become literally a 
laboratory for wise experimental legislation aiming to secure the 
	
36 E.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885). 
37 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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social and political betterment of the people as a whole.”38 Twenty 
years later, Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, in his dissent to 
the 1932 case New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, added what has become 
a famous remark on this theme: “It is one of the happy incidents of 
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”39 It has since 
become common to refer to the states as the “laboratories of 
democracy.”40 
In making these statements, Roosevelt and Brandeis clearly 
appreciated that policy variation across states could enable learning 
about policy response. Such variation is similar but not identical to 
adaptive diversification. A possibly important difference is that policy 
variation across states results from differences across states in their 
political orientation and, hence, may not emulate a randomized 
experiment. Nevertheless, policy variation across states can to some 
degree approximate adaptive diversification as a strategy to cope with 
uncertainty and reduce it over time. 
At present, the federal Controlled Substances Act mandates a 
uniform national classification of drugs that limits the ability of the 
states to effectively vary the drug laws that persons face.41 The Act 
consequently prevents implementation of the federalist version of 
adaptive diversification. The recent 2012 decisions by Washington 
and Colorado to eliminate state penalties for recreational use of 
marijuana42 challenge the federal government to rethink the 
Controlled Substances Act. Should the federal government henceforth 
drop the uniform national classification of drugs in the Act or decline 
to enforce it, society may begin on a path towards better drug control 
policy. 
 
	
38 Theodore Roosevelt, Introduction to CHARLES MCCARTHY, THE WISCONSIN IDEA, 
at vii, vii (1912). 
39 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
40 See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Laboratories of Democracy: Anatomy of a Metaphor, 
FEDERALIST OUTLOOK, May 2001, at 1, available at http://www.aei.org/files/2001/03/31 
/Laboratories%20of%20Democracy%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20Metaphor.pdf. 
41 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2006). 
42 Jonathan P. Caulkins et al., Semi-legal Marijuana in Colorado and Washington: 
What Comes Next?, OUPBLOG (Dec. 19, 2012, 10:30 AM), http://blog.oup.com/2012/12 
/semi-legal-marijuana-co-wa/. 
